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Abstract The effects of opioid abuse on health arewidely
documented, however, its effects on labor market out-
comes have only recently become a topic of scientific
inquiry.Whereas recent economic studies focus on various
measures of labor market participation, the present study
analyzes whether opioid prescription rates are associated
with the impetus for entrepreneurial activity. By drawing
on samples of US counties and US neighbor county-pairs
across state borders from the years 2007 to 2016, we find
that higher opioid prescription rates are associated with
fewer non-employer establishments and new firms
employing 1–4 employees. In an ancillary analysis of 50
US states from the years 2006 to 2016, we further show
that opioid prescription rates are associated with lower
entrepreneurial activity in general and opportunity-based
entrepreneurial activity in particular. Overall, both the
county-level and state-level analyses show that a higher
rate of opioid prescriptions is negatively associated with
new business formation. Although the estimated effect
sizes are small, they are sizeable in absolute terms.
Keywords Newbusiness formation . Entrepreneurship .
Opioids
JEL codes J01 . L26 .M13
1 Introduction
Opioids produce morphine-like effects and are used
for various medical reasons such as suppression of
pain, diarrhea, and cough. Still, opioids are also
often used for non-medical reasons because of their
amplifying effects on euphoria and intense feelings
of happiness. Opioids are addictive, and escalating
recreational use of opioids may result in addiction.
Rates of opioid misuse are estimated to be between
21 and 29% and rates of addiction between 8 and
12% (Vowles et al. 2015). Strikingly, every day,
more than 130 people die after overdosing on opi-
oids in the USA (National Institute on Drug Abuse
2018). The effects of opioid abuse are so far-
reaching in the USA that the Department of Health
and Human Services declared the opioid crisis in
2017 a national emergency.
In addition to the widely studied effects on health
and the social costs of prescription opioid abuse
(Reinhart et al. 2018), a recent stream of literature
has started to investigate the effect of prescription
opioids on labor market outcomes. Based on
county-level data, Harris et al. (2019) find strong
adverse effects on labor force participation rates,
employment-to-population ratios, and unemployment
rates. Currie et al. (2019) find that the effect of
opioids on employment-to-population ratios is posi-
tive but small for females and absent for males. When
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analyzing the relationship in the opposite direction,
they find that there is no clear relationship between
economic conditions and the abuse of opioids. The
findings of Aliprantis et al. (2019) are largely in line
with these results: Increases in the local opioid pre-
scription rate decrease prime-age employment rates
for both males and females; however, short-term un-
employment shocks were not associated with the
share of people abusing prescription opioids.
Building on and extending this focused, but
growing, stream of research on the economic impact
of the opioid crisis, we analyze the association be-
tween opioid prescriptions and new entrepreneurial
activity on both county and state levels. The use of
aggregated data has a particular advantage over
using individual-level data (Harris et al., 2019):
Self-reports of opioid use are subject to reporting
bias and measurement error, and it is known that a
considerable share of prescribed opioids is not con-
sumed by the one it is prescribed to but by family,
friends, or others. An individual-level analysis is
less likely to capture these dynamics, but county-
or state-level analysis allows estimation of the over-
all association between per capita opioid prescrip-
tions and new business establishment. Cascades and
spillovers from opioid abuse through social and
economic strata are better captured at an aggregated
level. Therefore, in this study, we use the aggregate
county- or state-level opioid prescription rates as
compiled by the Center for Disease Control. From
a policy perspective, the use of county-level data
comes with the advantage that policies aimed at
tackling the problems associated with opioid abuse
and campaigns for promoting firm startups are often
developed at the county level. At the county level,
there is substantial variation in opioid abuse
(Schuchat et al. 2017). Hence, our findings can be
informative for county-level policies.
Our results show that at the county-level (in the
full sample of counties as well as in the subsample
of neighbor counties across state borders), higher
opioid prescription rates are associated with fewer
non-employer establishments and new firms
employing 1–4 employees. At the state level, we
find that opioid prescription rates are associated with
lower entrepreneurial activity in general and
opportunity-based entrepreneurial activity in partic-
ular. The effect sizes at the county-level and state-
level are small, but sizable in terms of absolute
numbers. Though we stress that these results
should be interpreted as associational relationships
rather than causal relationships, these findings are
informative about the relationship between opioid
prescriptions and economic development and
supplement the finding by Harris et al. (2019) that
prescription opioids have a negative effect on the
labor force participation rate. Our results show that
decreased levels of new business activity may be
another channel through which prescription opioids
may be negatively associated with a county’s com-
position of the labor force and structure of the
economy.
The remainder of this study is organized as fol-
lows. The following section elaborates on the liter-
ature background of this study and formulates ex-
pectations about the relation between the opioid
prescription rate and new business formation at
county and state levels. Section 3 describes the data
we draw on as well as the methodology we adopt to
analyze the data. Section 4 presents the empirical
results. The final section discusses the findings and
concludes with policy recommendations and directions
for future research.
2 Literature background
The opioid crisis in the USA has reached “epidemic
levels” (White House Council of Economic
Advisors 2017). According to the Center for Disease
Control, between 1990 and 2017, 400,000 people
died of opioid abuse and with no sign of abating,
opioid overdoses increased by 30% between Ju-
ly 2016 and September 2017 in 52 areas in 45 states
(Center for Disease Control 2017). Opioid abuse has
a detrimental effect on individuals, families, and
local communities (Birnbaum et al. 2011; Meyer
et al. 2014). Though opioid abuse is mainly driven
by demand from patients, a recent set of studies
focuses on the role of supply-side drivers of opioid
prescriptions. For example, Barnett et al. (2017)
show that long-term opioid use was greater among
patients treated by high-intensity opioid prescribers.
Relatedly, Schnell and Currie (2018) find that phy-
sicians from top-ranked medical schools write fewer
opioid prescriptions. Strikingly, considering that pa-
tients may turn to the secondary (black) market to
procure opioids, physicians overprescribe by at least
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20% (Schnell 2017). To ameliorate the opioid crisis,
US states have passed prescription drug monitoring
programs (PDMPs). By electronically monitoring
the prescription of drugs, PDMPs can help to iden-
tify individuals who may be misusing prescription
opioids or other prescription drugs. However,
Buchmueller and Carey (2018) found that such pro-
grams have no effect on opioid prescriptions without
must access provisions, i.e., the obligation to query
the PDMP prior to prescribing opioids.1
The role of public health in driving economic
activity is documented in studies highlighting public
health conditions as important predictors of future
growth (Knowles and Owen 1997). The notion that
investments in human capital—including health
(Becker 1964)—improves economic outcomes has
received broad support since the 1960s (Grossman
1972; Leibowitz 2004; Bloom et al. 2004). In both
developed (Aghion et al. 2010; Swift 2011) and
developing (Bhargava et al. 2001) economies, health
is associated with economic growth. Good health is
also considered to be of crucial importance for new
business formation, because of demanding working
hours and increased capacity to cope with stressors
coming with running a business (Rietveld et al.
2015; Buttner 1992). Therefore, our core theoretical
premise on the relationship between opioid abuse
and firm formation stems from the health capital
literature. Still, we caution that our research topic
is relatively new and there may be other relevant
mechanisms explaining the complex and dynamic
relationship between opioid abuse and new business
formation.
Our expectations about the relationship between
the opioid prescription rate and new business activ-
ity are based on the notion that opioid abuse deteri-
orates both individual health capital and, therefore,
the aggregate human capital stock in an area (Howitt
2005). Poorer health lowers an individual’s produc-
tive efficiency (Cai and Kalb 2006) through in-
creased absenteeism, lower attention to tasks, lower
physical energy, poorer mental attention, and re-
duced creativity. Moreover, poor health lowers life
expectancy and the overall stock of human capital.
Opioid abuse deteriorates an individual’s health cap-
ital and therefore also the aggregate human capital
stock in a region. The presence and size of a creative
class are important factors explaining differences in
regional entrepreneurial activity (Florida 1995), and
a deteriorated level of structural, cognitive, and af-
fective human capital may, therefore, impact the
entrepreneurial capacity of a region. In addition,
the opioid crisis weakens the social cohesion of the
local community through higher divorce rates, or-
phaned children, bankruptcy, poverty, and a broader
sense of distress and hopelessness (Florence et al.
2016; Dasgupta et al. 2018). The weakened social
and communal cohesion would not only lower the
overall stock of human and financial resources in a
region but also reduce the bonding, bridging, and
linking capital in communities.
The few studies analyzing the relationship be-
tween opioid prescription rates and employment
rates all highlight the adverse effects on labor force
participation rates and unemployment rates. The
studies by Harris et al. (2019), Currie et al. (2019),
and Aliprantis et al. (2019) also highlight that this
relationship may differ depending on the use or
misuse of opioids. That is, the therapeutic potential
of opioids may enhance labor force participation but
the illegitimate uses may adversely affect it by mak-
ing it harder to perform at an adequate level in wage
work. Several studies have shown that good health
is an important asset for the setup and survival of a
business (Rietveld et al. 2015; Hessels et al. 2018),
and hence, the therapeutic use of opioids may pos-
itively influence the ability to create jobs by starting
or expanding a business. Harris et al. (2019) present
evidence that opioid abuse impels exit from the
labor force entirely because the relationship between
the opioid prescription rates with the unemployment
rate is marginally small, whereas the relationship
with the labor force participation rate is significantly
negative.
Increases in the local opioid prescription rate decrease
prime-age employment rates for both males and females
(Aliprantis et al. 2019), primarily by making people leave
the labor force entirely (Harris et al. 2019). The likelihood
of business start-up is highest for individuals in this age
category (Levesque and Minniti 2006), because of their
levels of human capital and occupational experience.
Hence, despite enhanced feelings of euphoria and
1 To fight the opioid epidemic, states also passed naloxone access laws
over time. Doleac and Mukherjee (2018) show that access to naloxone
increases opioid-induced emergency room visits and opioid-related
theft. They could not find a meaningful influence on opioid-related
mortality, but Packham (2019) finds such an effect especially in rural
and high-poverty areas.
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possibly self-efficacy through opioid use, overall (i.e., the
net effect), it is most likely that rates of new business
creation will be lower in regions with higher opioid
prescription rates. Innovative replacement of old tech-
niques and products with new ones by businesses is
considered to be a key factor contributing to economic
growth. Innovation revolutionizes industries from within
and brings industries and the economy as a whole to a
higher level. Therefore, we also expect the level of com-
petition within industries to go down in case fewer new
businesses enter the market.
3 Data and methodology
3.1 Sample
Our primary empirical analysis draws on county-level
data from the USA, and our secondary empirical analysis
is based on state-level data from the USA. In the county-
level data, we distinguish between the full sample and
neighbor county-pairs on opposite sides of a state border
within the sample. The county-pairs are based on the
closest geographic distance between centroids of the
two neighboring counties across a state border. Dube
et al. (2010) have shown that estimates in the latter
subsample are more precise because neighboring
counties are relatively similar in terms of geography and
economic activity, and hence, the presence of the state
border between these neighboring counties may facilitate
the estimation of effects of state-level laws (see Sect. 3.4).
After casewise deletion, we draw on 2711 counties
(22,057 county-year observations from 2007 to 2016) in
the full sample and 1011 counties (7964 county-pair-year
observations from 2007 to 2016) in the neighbor county-
pair sample. For the state-level analysis, we use data from
all the 50 US states (547 state-year observations from
2007 to 2017). All data sources arementioned in Sect. 3.2
(county-level analysis) and Sect. 3.3 (state-level analysis),
and more detailed descriptions are available in Tables 6,
7, and 8 in the Appendix.
3.2 Primary analysis: county-level analysis
3.2.1 Outcome variables
The Small Business Administration defines a small and
medium enterprise as a firm with 500 or fewer em-
ployees. In our study, we focus on the smallest and most
prevalent type of (new) establishments: (i) the logarithm
of the number of non-employer establishments from the
U.S. Census Bureau; and (ii) the logarithm of the num-
ber of new establishments with 1–4, 5–9, 10–19, and
20–49 employees from County Business Patterns. A
majority of firms in the USA are non-employer firms
(Miranda and Zolas 2017). These firms do not hire any
employees and include a variety of entrepreneurs in-
cluding solo entrepreneurs, contractors, husband-wife
teams, and professional services firms. New firm estab-
lishments (e.g., 1–4 employees) with relatively few
employees also represent a distinct firm type and cover
new firms that are typically entrepreneurial and less
likely to be a byproduct of spinoffs or company estab-
lishments (Acs and Armington 2006).
3.2.2 Predictor variable
Our main explanatory variable is the number of retail
opioid prescriptions per 100 residents in a county
(lagged by 1 year), as provided by the Center for Dis-
ease Control.
3.2.3 Control variables
Besides the inclusion of year fixed effects in our models,
we use three sets of control variables. The first set
includes characteristics of the county itself. Recent re-
search shows that the regional poverty level and racial
composition may be associated with the prescription
opioid epidemic (Song 2017). Therefore, we control
for the logarithm of the median real household income
in the county, the percentage of whites in the county
population, and the poverty rate in the county. The
median household income and poverty rates were ob-
tained from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Small Area In-
come and Poverty Estimates. The percentage white
population in the county was obtained from the U.S.
Census Bureau’s American Community Survey esti-
mates. Moreover, crime (especially drug-related crime)
may be associated with ease of access to opioid pre-
scriptions in the secondary (black) market. Therefore,
we control for the logarithm of violent crime in the
county and the logarithm of property crime in the coun-
ty. To directly control for the association between the
opioid prescription rate and drug-related crimes, we also
control for the logarithm of total drug-related offenses in
the county. County-level crime-related data were
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obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data at the county-
level.
Motivated by the local identification strategy used by
Dube et al. (2010), we include variables regarding the
characteristics of the border county in the second set of
control variables. This set of control variables is only
used in the neighbor county-pair analysis. Specifically,
we control for the neighbor county opioid prescription
rate and the logarithm of the median real household
income in the neighboring county.
Our third set of controls captures the state-level opi-
oid prescription laws which are likely to influence the
county-level opioid prescription rate. We control for
whether the county belongs to a state with must access
laws from the Prescription Drug Abuse Policy System
(PDAPS) with two binary variables. The first binary
variable reflects whether the state of the county has
any Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP)
law (1 = Yes; 0 = No). The second binary variable indi-
cates whether the state has a must access law meaning
that the state requires prescribers and dispensers to
check the PDMP before prescribing controlled sub-
stances (1 = Yes; 0 = No; Table 7 in the Appendix shows
the presence of must access laws by state). In the neigh-
bor county-pair analysis, we also control for whether the
state of the neighbor county has any PDMP law (1 =
Yes; 0 = No), and whether the neighbor county has a
must access law (1 = Yes; 0 = No).
3.3 Secondary analysis: state-level analysis
As a secondary analysis, we analyze new entrepre-
neurial activity at the state level. Our argumentation
that higher opioid prescription rates are associated
with a lower number of new firm establishments
holds for the aggregated county level as well as
other levels of aggregation such as the state. State-
level data is less fine-grained than county-level data,
and the sample size for the state-level analyses is
relatively small because there are fewer states than
counties in the USA. Nevertheless, analyses at state
level may be informative about the robustness of the
county-level results.
3.3.1 Outcome variables
We analyze two state-level entrepreneurship outcomes
which are provided by the Kauffman Foundation
(Fairlie 2013; Kauffman Foundation 2018). The first
measure, the Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurial Activ-
ity (KIEA), is a Z-score of (i) the rate of new entrepre-
neurs among the US adult population; (ii) the opportu-
nity share of new entrepreneurs, or the percentage of
new entrepreneurs primarily driven by “opportunity” vs.
by “necessity”; and (iii) the start-up density (new em-
ployer businesses less than one-year-old, normalized by
the population).
3.3.2 Predictor variable
Our main explanatory variable, similar to the county-
level analysis, is the number of retail opioid prescrip-
tions per 100 individuals in a state (lagged by one year),
as provided by the Center for Disease Control.
3.3.3 Control variables
Because opioid prescription rates could be associated
with low-income states, we include the logarithm of the
gross state product (measured in millions of current
dollars, all industry total), the logarithm of state personal
income (measured in thousands of current dollars), and
the poverty rate (percentage). Cannabis-related laws and
support for the poor may be associated with the political
atmosphere in a state, and therefore, we control for
whether the governor is a democrat (1 = Yes; 0 = No)
because the governor has the ultimate veto power on
state laws. To control for individuals on government
transfer payments, we control for the state Earned In-
come Tax Credit (EITC) rate (as percentage of the
federal credit), the state minimum wage in dollars per
hour, the logarithm of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), and Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) caseloads (average monthly number
of total family caseloads for AFDC and TANF). The
demographic makeup of the state could also influence
firm establishment; therefore, we control for the loga-
rithm of population size and the logarithm of a number
of employed state residents. These control variables are
supplied by the University of Kentucky Center for Pov-
erty Research (1980–2017) (University of Kentucky
Center for Poverty Research 2017). In a final model,
we also include a control variable capturing the presence
of recreational marijuana law (cannabis is legal for
recreational use or not, 1 = Yes; 0 = No). During 2010
and 2017, 32 states implementedmedical cannabis laws,
of which 17 states allowed only medical cannabis with
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low levels of the psychoactive tetrahydrocannabinol
(THC) and high levels of the non-psychoactive compo-
nent cannabidiol and eight states allowing the use of
cannabis for recreational purposes (Shover et al. 2019).
In all models, we include year fixed effects.
3.4 Methodology
We use fixed-effects specifications in which we investi-
gate the relationship between the opioid prescription
rate and new business establishment for both our prima-
ry (county-level) and secondary (state-level) analyses.
In the primary analysis, the fixed-effects are included for
each county. In the secondary analysis, they are included
for each state. To lower concerns about reverse causal-
ity, we use the 1 year lag of the opioid prescription rates
to analyze the relationship with new business formation.
For the county-level analysis, we provide estimates for
the full sample and the subsample of neighbor counties
across border states. Dube et al. (2010) have shown that
fixed-effects estimates that rely on cross-county varia-
tion may be prone to bias because of the large hetero-
geneity across counties (Dube et al. 2010). A neighbor
county-pair analysis helps to reduce bias due to aggre-
gated spatial heterogeneity in a sample (Dube et al.
2010), because “the geographic determinants of the
distribution of [activity] are approximately the same on
both sides of the border [and] if the policies make no
difference, there should be no abrupt change at the
border” (Holmes 1998, p. 671). Therefore, a neighbor-
county across state border estimation approach that con-
trols for PDMP and must access laws improves preci-
sion and lowers bias related to spatial heterogeneity.
Our control variables for the implementation of opi-
oid laws in states and counties help to reduce bias from
localized opioid trends. At the same time, the difference
in implementation timing of these laws across states and
counties makes a difference-in-difference design less
applicable as identification strategy because of the vary-
ing pre-trends and varying intensities of treatments from
the same unit (i.e., state) (see Appendix Table 7 for
information about the passage of PDMP and must ac-
cess laws in US states). Still, even with the border
county-pair design, we are not able to draw causal
inferences. Even with the border county-pair design, it
is possible that individuals from stricter opioid prescrip-
tion counties would simply travel to less strict counties
across state borders. Though this is possible, individuals
generally fill prescriptions from the same pharmacy,
doctors must be licensed to practice in the state where
they prescribe, and it is likely that the opioid crisis
makes pharmacists careful in filling prescriptions from
people from other counties or states. Nevertheless, op-
portunism in the prescription filling cannot be ruled out.
To lower bias due to spillovers from traveling to another
county, we control for neighbor county opioid prescrip-
tion rates and neighbor county real household median
income, in addition to the opioid laws in the neighbor
county.
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1a (full sample) and Table 1b (county-pair
subsample) depict the descriptive statistics of the
county-level analysis sample. Importantly, in both
the full sample and the county-pair subsample, there
is considerable variation across counties in new
business formation as well as in the lagged county
opioid prescription rate. Table 1a indicates that in
the full sample, 88.2% of the counties have some
PDMP law at the state level and 8.8% have must
access laws. These percentages are similar in the
neighbor county subsample. Table 2 provides de-
scriptive statistics for the sample included in the
state-level analysis. Also, at the state-level, there is
variation in terms of new business activity and the
opioid prescriptions rate. Only in 2% of the state-
year observations between 2006 and 2016, there
were laws for recreational marijuana use because
most of the recreational marijuana laws were only
passed recently. In the Appendix, we also provide
scatter plots to showcase the raw relationships be-
tween the lagged opioid prescription rate and the
outcome variables for the full county sample (Fig.
1), neighbor county sample (Fig. 2), and state sam-
ple (Fig. 3). These scatter plots do not indicate a
systematic directional pattern between the lagged
opioid prescription rate and the number of new firm
establishments.
4.2 Multivariate results
The simple univariate analysis in the scatter plots is
less informative due to the heterogeneity among
counties and variations across years, and therefore,
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics county-level analysis and state-level analysis
Mean S.D. Min. Max.
(a) Full county sample (Ncounty-year = 22,057, Ncounty = 2711)
Outcome variables
Logarithm of number of non-employer establishments 9.338 1.330 5.624 15.399
Logarithm of number of establishments with 1 to 4 employees 6.155 1.295 2.773 12.001
Logarithm of number of establishments with 5 to 9 employees 5.152 1.319 1.386 10.660
Logarithm of number of establishments with 10 to 19 employees 4.662 1.400 0.000 10.294
Logarithm of number of establishments with 20 to 49 employees 4.108 1.527 0.000 9.968
Main explanatory variable
Lagged county opioid prescription rate per 100 individuals (divided by 1000) 0.088 0.045 0.000 0.437
Control variables
Any PDMP law in the state 0.882 0.322 0.000 1.000
Must access law in the state 0.088 0.283 0.000 1.000
Logarithm of real household income in the county 10.806 0.238 10.048 11.855
Percentage white population in county 78.444 18.966 0.95 99.96
Poverty rate in the county 11.922 5.466 0.49 41.75
Logarithm of violent crime rate in the county 5.238 0.863 0.530 7.686
Logarithm of property crime rate in the county 7.484 0.708 1.338 9.501
Logarithm of total drug-related offenses in the county 4.903 1.652 0.000 11.299
(b) Neighbor county sample (Ncounty-year = 7964, Ncounty = 1011)
Outcome variables
Logarithm of number of non-employer establishments 9.370 1.363 5.768 14.541
Logarithm of number of establishments with 1 to 4 employees 6.207 1.330 2.944 11.218
Logarithm of number of establishments with 5 to 9 employees 5.204 1.342 1.386 10.017
Logarithm of number of establishments with 10 to 19 employees 4.710 1.430 0.000 9.674
Logarithm of number of establishments with 20 to 49 employees 4.152 1.554 0.000 9.343
Main explanatory variable
Lagged county opioid prescription rate per 100 individuals (divided by 1000) 0.092 0.047 0.001 0.437
Control variables
Any PDMP law in the state 0.870 0.336 0.000 1.000
Must access law in the state 0.100 0.301 0.000 1.000
Logarithm of real household income in the county 10.806 0.250 10.081 11.855
Percentage white population in county 79.983 17.665 9.890 99.07
Poverty rate in the county 11.879 5.476 0.490 39.05
Logarithm of violent crime rate in the county 5.234 0.869 1.223 7.686
Logarithm of property crime rate in the county 7.465 0.720 1.338 9.198
Logarithm of total drug-related offenses in the county 4.960 1.671 0.000 10.897
Neighbor county opioid prescription rate 91.297 47.311 0.000 437.2
Neighbor county has any PDMP law 0.888 0.316 0.000 1.000
Neighbor county in a state with must access law 0.094 0.291 0.000 1.000
Neighbor county logarithm of real median household income 10.801 0.251 10.081 11.705
(c) State sample (Nstate-year = 547, Nstate = 50)
Outcome variables
Entrepreneurial activity index − 0.431 1.145 − 3.236 2.880
Opportunity-based entrepreneurship 0.797 0.063 0.557 0.945
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we continue by presenting the results of our multi-
variate analysis. Our fixed-effects specification for
the full county sample is as follows:
Yct ¼ α0 þ α1Oct1 þ αxX ct þ αc þ ect;
with Yct representing the logarithm of new firm
establishment types by employee size in county c
in year t, Oct-1 the lagged opioid prescription rate in
county c in year t, Xc, t the set of control variables
(including year dummies), αc a vector with county
fixed-effects, and ec, t the error term. For the full
county-level analysis, we provide fixed-effects esti-
mates in Table 2 for models with an expanding set
of explanatory variables. In model 1, the relation-
ship between the lagged opioid description rate and
each outcome is significantly negative (except for
firm 5–9 and 10–19). The coefficient of our main
variables is only marginally sensitive towards the
inclusion of county-level control variables (model
2) as well as control variables capturing the presence
of opioid laws (model 3).
In model 3, an increase of 10 opioid prescriptions per
100 residents (the original unit is per 100 individuals,
but we divided values by 1000 for representation pur-
poses) is associated with a 0.185% reduction in the
number of non-employer establishments. This figure
translates to 21.02 fewer new non-employee establish-
ments in an average county. A similar increase in the
opioid prescription rate is associated with a decline of
0.135% in the number of new firms with 1 to 4 em-
ployees. Given the number of new businesses in this
size class, this percentage translates into 0.64 fewer
businesses in an average county. Interestingly, we find
a positive association for size class 10–19. Here, the
increase of 10 opioid prescriptions per 100 people in a
county is associated with a 0.105% increase in the
number of new business with this size (0.11 new busi-
nesses). For firm sizes between 20 and 49, we find a
decline of 0.239% (0.15 businesses). We broadly con-
clude that business formation declines with higher opi-
oid prescription rates. Effect sizes are small but relative-
ly sizeable in absolute terms for non-employer estab-
lishments and new establishments with 1–4 employees.
Identification in the subsample of neighbor county-
pairs across state borders rests on the idea that the
geographic determinants of the new business activity
will be approximately the same on both sides of the
border if policies make no difference. Therefore, we first
compare whether neighbor counties are significantly
different in terms of the control variables and in terms
of gross domestic product (GDP). Some counties have
multiple neighbors in common, and therefore, we focus
on symmetrical neighbor counties in this analysis. That
is, a county pair for which the first county is the neigh-
bor of the second and vice versa. We randomly assigned
one county in each county pair to be the focal county
and the other to be the neighbor county in the analysis of
differences. Moreover, we focus for these analyses on
the observations included in the neighbor county
Table 1 (continued)
Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Main explanatory variable
Lagged state opioid prescription rate per 100 individuals (divided by 1000) 0.082 0.022 0.042 0.147
Control variables
Recreational marijuana law 0.034 0.178 0.000 1.000
Logarithm of gross state product 12.169 1.024 10.119 14.846
Logarithm of state personal income 18.925 1.028 16.982 21.584
Poverty rate 13.222 3.340 5.800 23.100
Governor is democrat 0.441 0.497 0.000 1.000
State EITC rate 0.072 0.111 0.000 0.850
State minimum wage 7.399 0.993 2.650 11.000
Logarithm of AFDC and TANF caseloads 9.561 1.240 5.587 13.343
Logarithm of population size 15.175 1.007 13.190 17.493
Logarithm of number employed state residents 14.418 0.987 12.537 16.727
S.D. standard deviation, Min. minimum, Max. maximum
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analysis (Table 4). Table 3 shows that there are some
significant but small differences in means of control
variables between focal and neighbor counties (Loga-
rithm of violent crime rate in the county, Logarithm of
property crime rate in the county, and Logarithm of total
drug-related offenses in the county). However, we do
not find significant differences in terms of other control
variables nor in terms of GDP (all industries, private
sector, and government). Therefore, we conclude that
the results in our analysis are not likely to be driven by
omitted variable bias.
Table 4 includes the fixed-effects estimates for the
neighbor county-pair analysis. Model 1 includes the
lagged opioid prescriptions rate and year fixed-effects,
and model 2 additionally includes the county-level con-
trol variables. Model 3 complement model 2 with the
neighbor county control variables, and finally, in model
4, we include control variables for the presence of state-
level opioid laws. Overall, the effect sizes in Table 4 are
somewhat smaller as compared to the results in Table 2.
In model 4, an increase of 10 opioid prescriptions per
100 people is associated with a 0.118% decline in the
number of non-employer establishments. This figure
translates to 13.84 fewer new non-employee establish-
ments in an average county. A similar increase in the
county-prescription rate is associated with a decline of
0.122% in the number of new firms with 1 to 4 em-
ployees (0.61 businesses). We do not find a significant
relationship for firms with 5–9 employees, but a positive
relationship for size class 10–19 (0.234%, 0.26 busi-
nesses). For firm size class 20–49, we find a non-
significant relationship. Consistent with the full county
sample, we broadly conclude that the number of estab-
lishments declines with higher opioid prescription rates.
Effect sizes are small (and somewhat smaller than in the
full sample), but relatively sizeable in absolute terms for
non-employer establishments and new establishments
with 1–4 employees.
In Tables 9 and 10 in the Appendix, we further
explore whether the interaction between the county-
level opioid prescriptions rate and the presence of
state-level opioid laws is associated with our measures
for new business establishment. The presence of state-
level opioid laws may influence the opioid prescription
rates in a county, but from a policy point of view, it is
interesting to explore whether the association between
the opioid prescription rate and new business establish-
ment differs in the presence of state-level opioid laws. In
these models, we include all county-level and neighbor
county-level controls along with the year fixed effects.
Additionally, we include the interaction between the
opioid prescription rate with the presence of any PDMP
law in the state (model 1) and the interaction between
the opioid prescription rate and the presence of must
access laws in the state (model 2). We find that the
interaction terms are either negative or insignificant.
The exception is the association between the county
opioid prescription rate and the presence of a must
access law in the state and new firms with 10 to 19
employees. However, this association is small in abso-
lute terms. These negative interactionsmay be explained
by a higher abuse of opioids in the presence of strictly
enforced laws.
Our state-level analysis supplements the county-level
analysis. For the state-level analysis, the fixed-effect
specification is as follows:
Y st ¼ α0 þ α1Ost1 þ αxX st þ αs þ est;
with Yst representing the entrepreneurial activity index
or opportunity-based entrepreneurship in state s in year
t,Ost-1 the opioid prescription rate in state s in year t, Xs, t
the set of control variables (including year dummies), αs
a vector with state fixed-effects, and es, t the error term.
Table 5 presents the empirical results of the state-level
analysis. The first model for each outcome includes the
lagged opioid prescriptions rate only, and the second
model additionally includes all state-level control vari-
ables (except the presence of laws for recreational can-
nabis use). For each outcome, in model 1, the relation-
ship between the lagged opioid description rate and the
dependent variable is significantly negative. An increase
of 10 prescriptions per 100 individuals in the state is
associated with a 0.117 standard deviation decline in the
entrepreneurial activity index. However, this relation-
ship is only significant at the 10% level. For the outcome
variable opportunity-based entrepreneurship, the same
increase in the lagged state opioid prescription rate is
associated with an approximately 1% decrease in the
share of entrepreneurs driven by opportunity instead of
necessity. The inclusion of the control variables for
recreational cannabis use (model 3) does not change
these inferences.
5 Discussion and conclusion
According to a recently released report from the
National Institute of Health (NIH), in 2017, an
Prescription opioids and new business establishments
estimated 1.7 million people suffered from substance
use disorders related to prescription opioid pain re-
lievers in the USA (National Institute on Drug Abuse
2018). Despite the small prevalence rate at the pop-
ulation rate, the direct and indirect effects are devas-
tating, so much so that the current federal adminis-
tration declared prescription opioid abuse as a nation-
al health emergency. Though recent studies have
focused on the influence of prescription opioids on
labor market outcomes, we focused in this study on
the impact on new business formation.
In addition to the health, social, and emotional
costs, our analyses at the county-level show that
there is a small but significant negative relationship
between the rate of opioid prescriptions and non-
employer establishments and new firm establish-
ments with 1–4 employees even after controlling
for both county-level and neighbor county condi-
tions. We also find a positive significant relationship
with the number of new businesses with 10–19
employees (in the full sample as well as in the
neighbor county-pair sample) and a negative rela-
tionship with the number of new business with 20–
49 employees (full county sample only). However,
in absolute terms, these latter relationships are small.
The state-level analyses complement these results by
showing that also at the state level, there is a small
but significant relationship between the opioid pre-
scription rate and new business formation (in partic-
ular opportunity-based as opposed to necessity-
driven entrepreneurship). Although freelancers and
contractors represent a significant portion of the
non-employer establishments, the county-level and
state-level results together suggest that the switch to
Table 3 Analysis of differences regarding control variables and gross domestic product between neighboring counties. Counties in each
county-pair are randomly assigned to be focal or neighbor county
Counties Number of
county-year
observations
Mean Standard error p value
Control variables:
Any PDMP law in the state Focal 2232 0.903 0.006 0.227
Neighbor 2161 0.892 0.007
Must access law in the state Focal 2232 0.107 0.007 0.786
Neighbor 2161 0.104 0.007
Logarithm real household income in the county Focal 2232 10.789 0.005 0.801
Neighbor 2161 10.788 0.005
Percent white population in the county Focal 2232 81.085 0.353 0.705
Neighbor 2161 81.277 0.366
Poverty rate in the county Focal 2232 11.920 0.110 0.338
Neighbor 2161 12.076 0.119
Logarithm of violent crime rate in the county Focal 2232 5.161 0.019 0.027
Neighbor 2161 5.191 0.019
Logarithm of property crime rate in the county Focal 2232 7.430 0.016 0.022
Neighbor 2161 7.485 0.015
Logarithm of total drug-related offenses in the county Focal 2232 4.801 0.036 0.009
Neighbor 2161 4.934 0.036
Gross domestic product:
Logarithm of real GDP (all industries) Focal 743 14.016 0.054 0.687
Neighbor 715 14.047 0.052
Logarithm of real GDP (private sector) Focal 730 12.709 0.051 0.349
Neighbor 701 12.777 0.051
Logarithm of real GDP (government) Focal 743 12.067 0.053 0.802
Neighbor 715 12.086 0.050
p value reflects the result of a two-sided test for a difference in means between focal and neighbor counties. County-level gross domestic
product (GDP) data were only released recently for 2012–2015 by the US Bureau for Economic Analysis (https://www.bea.
gov/data/gdp/gdp-county)
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non-employer firms may not be due to necessity-
driven entrepreneurship (individuals switching to
self-employment after losing their job due to opioid
usage). Therefore, overall, we conclude that the
relationship between the opioids prescription rate
and new business formation is negative.
These findings are of particular interest to
policymakers. With the opioid crisis at the center stage
of political debate and recent works highlighting the
negative implications for the labor market, the current
findings support the need to focus on the small and
negative influence of opioid prescriptions on new busi-
ness activity. For comparison, Harris et al. (2019) find
that a 10% increase in prescriptions reduces labor force
participation by 0.56%. We find that an increase of 10
opioid prescriptions per 100 people is associated
with a 0.12% decline in the number of non-
employer establishments. With non-employer firms
representing about three-quarters of the 30.2 mil-
lion small businesses in the USA (Small Business
Table 5 Results of state-level fixed-effects regressions
Outcome variable: Entrepreneurial activity index Opportunity-based entrepreneurship
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Lagged state opioid prescription rate (/1000) − 14.590** − 13.145* − 11.681* − 1.117** − 1.058** − 1.037**
(6.895) (6.852) (6.909) (0.473) (0.463) (0.468)
Logarithm of gross state product − 1.601* − 1.227 0.129** 0.134**
(0.966) (0.995) (0.065) (0.067)
Logarithm of state personal income 1.130 0.450 0.074 0.064
(1.576) (1.635) (0.106) (0.111)
Poverty rate − 0.014 − 0.014 − 0.005*** − 0.005***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.002) (0.002)
Governor is democrat 0.177** 0.178** − 0.000 − 0.000
(0.082) (0.082) (0.006) (0.006)
State EITC rate 1.119** 0.950* 0.047 0.044
(0.544) (0.554) (0.037) (0.038)
State minimum wage 0.084 0.066 0.003 0.003
(0.060) (0.061) (0.004) (0.004)
Logarithm of AFDC and TANF caseloads − 0.037 − 0.076 − 0.009 − 0.009
(0.131) (0.133) (0.009) (0.009)
Logarithm of population − 3.146 − 3.521 0.139 0.133
(2.779) (2.786) (0.188) (0.189)
Logarithm of employment 5.936*** 6.112*** 0.051 0.054
(2.236) (2.236) (0.151) (0.151)
Recreational cannabis law 0.348 0.005
(0.227) (0.015)
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 1.161** − 39.128 − 27.243 0.921*** − 4.836*** − 4.660**
(0.503) (27.324) (28.362) (0.035) (1.847) (1.921)
N (state-year) 547 547 547 547 547 547
N (state) 50 50 50 50 50 50
R-squared (within) 0.256 0.298 0.301 0.276 0.337 0.338
Standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Prescription opioids and new business establishments
Administration 2018), a 0.12% decline in non-
employer firms translates to about 27,000 fewer
non-employer firms. Hence, although these de-
clines seem relatively small from a percentage
point of view, they are practically meaningful in
terms of absolute numbers. Over time, these de-
clines could have a long-term detrimental impact
on the overall entrepreneurial activity of regions
by lowering entrepreneurial efficacy and competi-
tiveness. We call on policymakers to consider the
negative impact of opioid prescriptions on new
business activity in their efforts to tackle the opi-
oid crisis. Moreover, because of the significant
interactions we find between the opioid prescrip-
tion rates and the presence of state-level opioid
laws, a system approach will be needed to project
what can be expected with and without interventions
(Phillips et al. 2017).
With our focus on entrepreneurial activity and
new business formation of in particular relatively
small firms, we analyzed different labor market
characteristics than Harris et al. (2019), Currie
et al. (2019), and Aliprantis et al. (2019). We
enrich their findings that opioid prescription rates
are negatively related to labor force participation
rates, employment-to-population ratios, and unem-
ployment rates by providing additional evidence
that higher opioid description rates primarily
make individuals leave the labor force as there
seems to be only a weak relationship with new
business formation. Our state-level analysis demon-
strates a decline in entrepreneurial activity, espe-
cially opportunity-driven entrepreneurship. Because
opportunity-based entrepreneurship is the core of
economic growth, and the general support for a
decline in the general entrepreneurial activity, the
reverberations of opioid prescriptions seem to go
beyond the labor force and influence also the com-
position of the business population. Because of the
relationship between entrepreneurship and econom-
ic growth, it seems also plausible to conclude that
the opioid crisis will also hamper economic growth
in the long run.
Although county-pair analyses have particular ad-
vantages, as described in Sects. 3.1 and 3.4, future
studies on opioids use and entrepreneurial activity
may take an individual-level approach which might
be able to reveal particular channels through which
opioid use influences business start-up. In such a
setup, it will be important to distinguish the use
and misuse. Due to the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA) restric-
tions, disaggregated data may be difficult to collate
even from the confidential U.S. Census data or the
Center for Disease Control (CDC) data. Finally,
we note that there may be many complexities
in the relationship between opioid abuse and
entrepreneurial activity which we could not explore
in the context of this study. For example, the legal
context may also indirectly influence new business
formation. Fairlie (2002) has shown that drug deal-
ing in youth increases the probability to engage in
self-employment in later life. Longitudinal individ-
ual level would also make it possible to analyze
these types of relationships over time.
Although the County Business Patterns data is a
reliable source providing information on year-to-year
firm establishments, identifying year-to-year busi-
ness closures is difficult to identify at the county-
level from the publicly available data sources. Still,
we believe that the analysis of aggregated data on
business closure is an important direction for future
research for two reasons. First of all, the abuse of
opioids by business owners is likely to lower busi-
ness focus and increase the hazard of business failure.
Still, widespread abuse of opioids may also make
those low-performing business owners survive in
the market because of a deteriorated business envi-
ronment (lower competition). Second, relatedly, a
general decline in human capital and financial condi-
tions because of opioid abuse may lower the quality
of human capital inputs. Therefore, the likelihood of
re-entry after business closure or business failure
may reduce, which may also have consequences for
the general business environment. Therefore, in ad-
dition to the relationship between opioid prescription
rates and new business establishment explored here,
we consider the investigation of business closures
driven by opioid abuse to be an important direction
for future research.
C. A. Rietveld, P. C. Patel
Appendix
Fig. 1 The relationship between the lagged opioid prescription rate and new business formation in the county-level sample (full sample)
Prescription opioids and new business establishments
Fig. 2 The relationship between the lagged opioid prescription rate and new business formation in the county-level sample (neighbor
county-pair subsample)
C. A. Rietveld, P. C. Patel
Fig. 3 The relationship between
the lagged opioid prescription rate
and entrepreneurial activity in the
state-level sample
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Table 7 States with “must access law,” meaning that the state
requires prescribers and dispensers to check the Prescription Drug
Monitoring Program before prescribing controlled substances
(1998 and 2016). Source: Prescription Drug Abuse Policy System
(PDAPS.org)
State Year must access law was enacted
Connecticut 2015
Indiana 2014
Kentucky 2012
Louisiana 2014
Massachusetts 2014
Nevada 2015
New Jersey 2015
New Mexico 2012
New York 2013
Ohio 2015
Oklahoma 2015
Pennsylvania 2015
Tennessee 2013
Vermont 2015
Virginia 2015
West Virginia 2012
Due to space limitations, the table only provides the listing of must
access laws. Comprehensive information about a variety of PDMP
laws and their year of passage are available at http://pdaps.
org/datasets/prescription-monitoring-program-laws-1408223416-
1502818373
Table 8 Data sources for the state-level analysis
Variable Data Source
Outcome variables
Entrepreneurial activity index Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurial Activity
(KIEA) (KESE Index - Data 1998–2017)
https://www.kauffman.org/historical-kauffman-index
Opportunity entrepreneurship Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurial Activity
(KIEA) (KESE - Opportunity Share of
New Entrepreneurs - Data 1996–2017)
https://www.kauffman.org/historical-kauffman-index
Main explanatory variable
Lagged state opioid prescription rate per
100 individuals (divided by 1000)
Center for Disease Controls, US https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/maps/rxrate-maps.html
Control variables
Recreational marijuana law State Marijuana Data from Shover et al. (2019) Shover, C. L., Davis, C. S., Gordon, S. C., & Humphreys,
K. (2019). Association between medical cannabis laws
and opioid overdose mortality has reversed over time.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
116(26), 12624–12626.
Logarithm of gross state product University of Kentucky Center for Poverty
Research
UKCPR National Welfare Data 1980–2017
(http://ukcpr.org/resources/national-welfare-data)Logarithm of state personal income
Poverty rate
Governor is democrat
State EITC rate
State minimum wage
Logarithm of AFDC and TANF caseloads
Logarithm of population size
Logarithm of number employed state residents
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